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INTRODUCTION 
There have been numerous incidents in the airspace of the Baltic Sea area concerning military 
aircraft that do not have transponders or have switched them off. Most airplanes do not violate 
the State border deliberately. However, they do cause problems in military as well as in civil 
aviation. In order to reduce the number of flight incidents and to promote aviation safety in the 
Baltic Sea airspace, Sauli Niinistö proposed:   
“A small step of this kind could help avoid accidents, in the context of which I have brought up 
the much-discussed issue of flying without transponders. We have been aware, or made aware, 
that this may also present a major risk of accidents. I have proposed that, in the Baltic Sea region, 
we seek a general agreement to use transponders; that no flights are made without them.”1  
The main problems about the establishment of the obligation to use activated transponders is 
that the freedom of overflight in the Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a customary law 
principle and it is questionable if coastal States have a right to set limits to this freedom. Also, 
UNCLOS Article 311(3) sets limits to signing inter se treaties to limit the principal freedoms 
that are provided by the convention, but do not specify what are those principals that are meant 
under this provision.  
Freedom of overflight is typically characterized as a freedom of the high seas as set in Article 
87, but as set in Article 58(1) it can be used in the EEZ also. The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)2 does not give a clear and concrete answer about the legal 
rights and obligations in regard to aircraft in the airspace above the EEZ.3  
The EEZ is relatively new comparing to other maritime zones. It was first discussed during the 
third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. To guarantee that States would 
                                                 
1 The President of the Republic of Finland. Joint press conference by President of the Republic Sauli 
Niinistö and President of Russia Vladimir Putin at Kultaranta on 1 June 2016 (transcript, English 
translation). News, 04.04.2016; Accessible at: 
http://www.presidentti.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=348650&culture=en-US (12.10.2017). 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay 10.12.1982, e.i.f. 16.11.1994. 
3 K. Hailbronner. Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea. - 77 The American 
Journal of International Law 1983, p. 503. 
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recognize EEZ significant allowances were made for navigational freedoms.4 EEZ is described 
in UNCLOS Part V as an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea where the rights and 
jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are both represented.5 
The freedom of navigation may have several restrictions in the EEZ as compared with the 
unlimited right in the high seas.  
There are scholars who see the freedom of navigation as part of customary international law. 
For example, there is an opinion, that all provisions about freedom of movement in UNCLOS 
are customary law and because of that reason they are binding to all nations.6 This leads to an 
argument that the freedom of overflight can be used by all States, even those who are not parties 
to UNCLOS.  
The right of overflight is an important part of freedom of navigation, but rights are often limited 
or there are duties that must be considered with while performing the right. According to 
UNCLOS, the State who is using the right of overflight is required to respect the laws and 
restrictions adopted by the coastal State.7 This means that there is a right that applies to all 
States, but that right can be limited with the laws of a coastal State. In which conditions and on 
what extent, are to be analyzed in the present thesis. 
While there are comprehensive conventions that regulate the civil aviation, military aircraft 
have been left out of them, causing another unclear aspect in solving the problem. Although, 
there are some specific aspects those conventions determine about military aircraft as well, 
those are mostly about what they are not allowed to do and not about the overall regulation or 
even to define the term State aircraft. 
The goal of international aviation law is to find a balance between freedom of the air and 
jurisdictional claims of the coastal States and because of that some scholars interpret the 
                                                 
4 Rothwell, Stephens, op. cit., p. 242. 
5 UNCLOS, Art. 55. 
6 R. Pedrozo. Is It Time for the United States to Join the Law of the Sea Convention - 41 Journal of 
Maritime Law & Commerce 2010(2), p. 156. 
7 UNCLOS, Art. 58(3). 
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UNCLOS in favor of the freedom of the air principle that is understood to be customary law8 
next to the other customary law principle from the law of the sea – freedom of the high seas.  
 
The main purpose of this study is to find out on which legal grounds it is possible to establish 
an international obligation for military aircraft to fly with activated transponders over the Baltic 
Sea. This paper will determine if this kind of an obligation is possible at all considering 
international law and on what conditions can it be created.  
This study is important for all States in the Baltic Sea area to help to guarantee the aviation 
safety in their airspace and understand the rights and obligations that apply to themselves and 
to other States who use their airspace in the EEZ for transit passage or for other reasons. Since 
the status of military aircraft in time of peace has been studied in very limited times, this thesis 
can be informative for other States and international organizations as well. 
The primary research question is: On which legal grounds would it be possible to establish an 
international obligation for military aircraft to fly with activated transponders over the Baltic 
Sea? Additionally, the problem refers to a question, if coastal States have a right to limit the 
freedom of overflight in the EEZ only for navigational safety purposes? 
At the time this thesis was written, there was no international obligation to make military 
aircraft turn their transponders on and that is a big concern for military aviation safety, but also 
a great threat to civil aviation as well. All States are sovereign to sign a treaty and take 
commitments with it, but the problem is that international law should include responsibility to 
use the given freedoms and rights in a safe way to ensure safety for themselves and others. 
There is a need to find out if that kind of an obligation would even be possible to create and on 
which legal grounds.  
The object of the study is military aircraft. For civil aircraft and flight safety there is already an 
international convention signed in 1944, but in a field of military a treaty is difficult to compile. 
Author of this thesis has decided to narrow down the research by focusing about the freedom 
                                                 
8 Hailbronner, op. cit., p. 520. 
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of overflight for military aircraft, since there is not yet an international obligation for them.  The 
thesis is limited to the time of peace and therefore regulations set in Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols, Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, San Remo Manual and other 
humanitarian law treaties and rules will not be analyzed in this paper. 
The hypothesis of the study is that it is possible to establish a treaty obligation to make military 
aircraft fly with activated transponders in the EEZ.  
Papers on the freedom of navigation have been published by international law scholars, but it 
is difficult to find a paper solely about freedom of overflight. However, there is a master’s thesis 
by Estonian researcher Habakuk in a field of security studies about Russian Air Force’s Risk 
Behavior in the Baltic Sea Region. Since the freedom of overflight used by military aircraft in 
time of peace is not directly regulated under international law, there is a need to clarify the 
regulations that exist and if limits can be made to the freedom.  
The study consists of three parts. For the understanding of the problem of this thesis it is 
important to understand the background of the problem, therefore, the principle of the freedom 
of overflight was explained in the first chapter in more detail. The first chapter focuses on the 
freedom of overflight and the problems related to it in the Baltic Sea area. It focuses on the 
origin and historical development of the freedom of overflight as a separate concept that is 
practiced in the EEZ, also on the reasons why military aircraft without transponders create 
problems, and why are they a threat to navigational safety in the Baltic Sea region. The 
difference of status of civil, state, and military aircraft under international law is also analyzed. 
The second chapter shows what obligations and rights States have during the freedom of 
overflight under international law. Furthermore, it is analyzed if and how it is possible to limit 
those rights by an international treaty. There are numerous international organizations to which 
the States in the Baltic Sea region are parties to, so it will be shown in the second chapter if any 
of them could help to solve the problem with nonactivated transponders. As a result of the 
research made in this chapter, it will be understood if an obligation to use activated transponders 
is allowed to establish under international law.  
In the third chapter there will be analyzed if States in Baltic Sea region have already limited the 
freedom of overflight under their national legislation and if they have already solved the 
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situation with non-activated transponders in their territory. This part of the thesis is also about 
if States have used international law in their benefit by interpreting it the way they see it as 
propriate.  
The primary source used in this thesis is the UNCLOS adopted in 1982. As secondary sources 
there are used articles from books and academic journals about the freedom of overflight in the 
EEZ and other topics related to this thesis, additionally, the Chicago Convention on Civil 
Aviation (Chicago Convention)9 and relevant case law. The Chicago Convention is about civil 
aircraft, but the author has decided to use it to make sure if there are still some fundamental 
principles that have been internationally agreed on and could be acceptable in military as well. 
The topic of this thesis is limited to military aircraft, so international law in conflict situations 
is not analyzed. The thesis is supported with numerous newspaper articles to show that the 
problem is real and timely, and that the solution is needed.  
The sources of the third chapter are limited due to the fact that Polish law on aviation was not 
available in English and most States do not have a separate Act for national defence.  
Analytical legal method is mainly used in this study. In the part of historical analyze of the 
development of the freedom of overflight, the historical research method will be partly used as 
well. Comparative method is used in the third chapter to analyze the legislation of the States in 
the Baltic Sea region. 
 
I am deeply thankful to Marten and my family for all the support they have offered me and for 
giving me an opportunity to continue my studies. I would like to express thanks to my 
supervisor Alexander Lott who introduced me to this topic and guided me throughout the 
process of writing the thesis.  
                                                 
9 The Convention on International Civil Aviation. Chicago: 7.12.1944, e.i.f. 4.04.1947. 
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I. FREEDOM OF OVERFLIGHT AND THE USE OF 
TRANSPONDERS 
1.1. The principle of freedom of overflight 
Freedom of navigation is one of the oldest principles in the international law of the sea.10 It was 
enshrined already in the 17th century by Hugo Grotius who wrote that navigation is free for 
everyone11 and because of that no State should rule the sea.12 The principle idea of the freedom 
of the high seas was the freedom of movement in general.13 In time the freedom of movement 
became the freedom of navigation and overflight and during the time of the Law of the Sea 
conferences some limitations to the freedom of navigation were accepted by the international 
community.  
Although, freedom of navigation is in most part important because of the carriage of goods by 
the sea, the freedom of overflight has also always been very important since airplanes were 
started to use, because they can create a great military advantage and by that they may cause 
threat to the peace and security in some regions of the world.14 Aircraft, that are challenging 
the freedom of overflight by entering another State’s territorial sea are, in most cases 
unintentionally, risking with diplomatic conflicts that could in worst cases lead to armed 
conflicts. Another type of actions that challenge the freedom of overflight happen even more 
often and can cause the same risks and a risk of collision with other aircraft in addition, is the 
failure to use activated transponders by military aircraft. Due to these problems, discussions 
about the concept and regulation of the freedom of overflight has been more frequent in 
international community. 
                                                 
10 R. Wolfrüm. Freedom of Navigation: New Challenges. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
– M. H. Nordquist, T. T. B. Koh and J. N. Moore. Freedom of seas, passage rights and the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009, p. 80.  
11 H. Grotius. The Free Sea.  – K. Haakonssen (ed). Liberty Fond: Indianapolis 2004, p. 10. 
12 Ibid., p. 30. 
13 Wolfrüm, op. cit., p. 81. 
14 Rothwell, Stephens, op. cit., p. 241. 
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General principle is that the high seas are open to all States, no matter if they are coastal or 
land-locked.15 According to the latter statement, the freedom of navigation is equal to use by 
all States despite their geographical position. The rule under Article 89 says that no State may 
subordinate any part of the high seas to its sovereignty, the rule is the same about the superjacent 
airspace beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea.16 The freedom of navigation is intended to 
be used by all, irrespective if the vessel or aircraft belongs to any State or even when it is 
stateless. Freedom of overflight is an example of the lawful uses of the airspace above the high 
seas that can be used for such activities as military exercises, aerial reconnaissance and other 
activities of military and civil aircraft.17 Originally, the navigation for vessels and aircraft is 
meant to be free and not a subject to limitation by coastal States.  
Under a term “overflight” there is meant an action when an aircraft leaves the airspace of its 
State of nationality.18 The freedom of overflight allows the aircraft to fly anywhere in the world, 
as long as they fly over the high seas or the EEZ, without the control of coastal States. While 
the innocent passage regime has been known as a customary law rule for centuries, even today, 
this right applies only to ships and there is no customary right to overflight above another State’s 
territorial sea.19  
According to UNCLOS Art 87(1)(b) the freedom of overflight is originally a right of the high 
seas, but it also applies to the EEZ according to the clause in Article 58(1). UNCLOS Article 
58(1) directly refers to the freedoms of the high sea in Article 87, so the right is based on the 
same principle in the EEZ as it is in the high seas and the basic rights and obligations that are 
regulated about the freedom of navigation in the EEZ should be identical to those in the high 
seas. Compared to the freedom of navigation that applies to the high seas, there are still created 
limitations in UNCLOS that apply to the EEZ, so general provisions about the high seas that 
are in Articles 88-115 apply to the EEZ as far as they are not incompatible with the Articles 
about the EEZ that are in Part V of the UNCLOS.20 Accordingly, the freedom of navigation and 
                                                 
15 M. H. Nordquist, S. N. Nandan, et al. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary. Vol. III. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995, p. 80. 
16 Ibid., p. 80. 
17 Hailbronner, op. cit., p. 503. 
18 J. Wouters, B. Demeyere. Overflight. Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, July 
2008, para. 1. 
19 Ibid., para. 9. 
20 H. Lindpere. Kaasaegne rahvusvaheline mereõigus. [Contemporary International Law of the Sea] 
Tallinn: Kirjastus Ilo 2003, p. 84. 
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overflight in the EEZ is in big part the same as in the high seas, but specific characteristics of 
the EEZ that include the rights and obligations of States have to be considered. 
Articles in UNCLOS do not show any difference between the rules of freedom of navigation 
and freedom of overflight, so the freedom of overflight has the same limitations as the freedom 
of navigation.21 Since the basic idea of the freedom of navigation is freedom of movement, as 
discussed previously, then there is no difference if it is carried out by the sea with a vessel or 
above the sea with an aircraft. It can be argued that the freedom of navigation and overflight 
can be limited in relation to the coastal State’s right to construct artificial islands and 
installations, furthermore, the coastal State’s competence to regulate the dumping of waste and 
some States add that the use of aircraft for military exercises are also limited in the EEZ of the 
coastal State.22  
Within the First Conference on the Law of the Sea there was a dispute that subsequently lead 
to the Exclusive Fisheries Zone that was asserted by international practice.23 At the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea there was already held a debate on the navigation regime in 
the EEZ.24 In that debate, the developing States saw the EEZ as an extension of national 
jurisdiction in which the coastal State would enjoy sovereignty, while the maritime powers saw 
the zone as a part of the high seas and believed that States should have extra rights only over 
offshore resources.25 The conflict was thus between the coastal State’s right over the marine 
resources and other State’s right to freedom of navigation. As a result of long negotiations, 
UNCLOS Article 58(1) was accepted claiming that all States enjoy the freedom of navigation 
and overflight in the EEZ while according to Article 58(3) States have to follow the rules of the 
coastal State during their navigation in other States EEZ.  
During the negotiations that were held over the establishment of the EEZ as a new maritime 
zone, arguments about the legal status of the EEZ needed to be settled as well. After considering 
the consequences in cases where the EEZ would be a residual phenomenon of whether the 
                                                 
21 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe. The Law of the Sea. 3rd ed., Manchester: Manchester University 
Press 1999, p. 173. 
22 Ibid., p. 173. 
23 G. Andreone. The Exclusive Economic Zone - The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea. D. 
Rothwell, et. al. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2015, p. 161. 
24 S. Bateman. Security and the Law of the Sea in East Asia: Navigational Regimes and Exclusive 
Economic Zone – The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects. David Freestone et. al. (ed). Oxford 
University Press: New York 2006, p. 379. 
25 Ibid., p. 379. 
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territorial sea or the high seas, it was decided that the EEZ forms a separate functional zone 
between the high seas and the territorial sea and has a sui generis character.26 After the 
negotiations, State practice in establishing EEZ-s was constant and widespread. Before 
UNCLOS came into force in 1994, EEZ was already declared to be a part of customary 
international law by the ICJ.27 
The fact that EEZ is totally separate zone with its own rules has led to a principal question: 
What kind of aerial navigation regulations apply to aircraft that fly over the EEZ?28 Scholars 
have for a long time claimed that it is uncertain which rules of the air apply to aircraft in the 
EEZ.29 The 1944 Chicago Convention that applies to civil aircraft has been offered as one 
option.30 However, the Chicago Convention was adopted before the Third Conference on the 
Law of the Sea and it did not consider the future existence of the EEZ. So, when applying that 
convention, the characteristics and legal regime of the EEZ and its difference from the regime 
in the high seas that is brought out in UNCLOS Articles 88-115 would still have to be 
considered.  
During the UNCLOS debate, when the developing States were able to geographically extend 
the legal regime of territorial sea up to 200 nm, the developed States saw this as a threat to the 
possibility to fly their aircraft around the globe.31 As a compromise, the extended area became 
a new zone, the EEZ, where there the right of overflight was granted, since it was not related to 
the issue of the access to resources that was under the jurisdiction of the coastal State.32 
However, when coastal State uses its rights it could still have an effect on the navigation rights 
of other States. 
The Chicago Convention regulates the navigation of civil aircraft and the convention itself is 
remarkably old, considering that there are many new important issues that have appeared and 
need to be regulated. It might be reasonable to discuss the possibility that the Civil Aviation 
                                                 
26 Churchill, Lowe, op. cit., p. 166. 
27 Andreone, op. cit., p. 162; Churchill, Lowe, op. cit., p. 161. 
28 Lindpere, op. cit., p. 86. 
29 Churchill, Lowe, op. cit., p. 173. 
30 Lindpere, op. cit., p. 86. 
31 Wouters, Demeyere, op. cit., para. 25. 
32 Ibid., para. 25. 
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Organization rules apply to the EEZ,33 however, it is questionable if the regulations in the 
Chicago Convention should be applied to military aircraft if relevant changes would be made.   
However, the freedom of overflight above international waters does not mean that the aircraft 
exercising this right would be out of the reach of law.34 A limitation to this freedom is set in 
UNCLOS Article 87(2), according the which, the freedoms of the high seas, including the 
freedom of overflight, must be exercised with due regard for the interests of other States who 
also exercise those rights. Therefore, States must enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight 
in a way they do not limit other State’s abilities to do so. 
A dispute has arisen over the different interpretations of UNCLOS over the coastal State’s 
capacity to regulate certain types of overflight by military aircraft, since the right of overflight 
applies within the international airspace of the EEZ35 and the coastal State has some options to 
restrict that. The question about the coastal States rights and capabilities under international law 
to limit or regulate the freedom of overflight in the EEZ will be further analyzed in the second 
chapter of this paper. 
The freedom of overflight provided in UNCLOS does not distinguish between military and civil 
aircraft in the matter of navigation and overflight. Only parts where UNCLOS brings out 
military aircraft specifically are a seizure on account of piracy,36 right of visit on the high seas,37 
the right of hot pursuit,38 the powers of enforcement against foreign vessels,39 and a possibility 
to make declarations about a dispute settlement category.40 While military aircraft has been 
pointed out in UNCLOS only in specific Articles and it has not been done so in the freedom of 
navigation and overflight provisions, it rather leads to understanding that the right of overflight 
is applicable to all types of aircraft equally no matter if it is civil or military aircraft. This has 
also been the understanding of scholars.41 For supporting the latter claim, the distinction 
between civil and military aircraft under international law will be analyzed.  
                                                 
33 Churchill, Lowe, op. cit., p. 173. 
34 Wouters, Demeyere, op. cit., para. 24. 
35 Rothwell, Stephens, op. cit., p.305. 
36 UNCLOS, Art. 107. 
37 UNCLOS, Art. 110(4). 
38 UNCLOS, Art. 111(5). 
39 UNCLOS, Art. 224. 
40 UNCLOS, Art. 298(1)(b). 
41 Wouters, Demeyere, op. cit., para. 23. 
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1.2. Distinction between civil and military aircraft under international law 
It is worth to notice that while UNCLOS does not distinguish between military and civil aircraft, 
the Chicago Convention does make that difference.  
Since the Chicago Convention sets obligations to civil aircraft only, it is argued if its Article 
3(b) gives a clear definition to what is a civil or military aircraft or not.42 Numerous other 
conventions about aviation exclude military aircraft as well.43 Therefore, applicable regulations 
for civil and military aircraft under international law are different and it is important to 
understand the difference civil and military aircraft have under international law. 
First, is has to be clear what is meant under an aircraft. The Chicago Convention is the only 
source in international law where it is possible to find the definition of an aircraft in general 
and according to latter it is “any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the 
reactions of the other than the reaction of the air against the earth’s surface.”44 There is no 
accepted dictionary meaning for the term “aircraft,” however, the word  does cover so many 
different types of flying instruments that would be almost impossible to cover by the dictionary 
meaning anyhow.45 Failure to define a specific definition of an aircraft does not mean that the 
regulation of navigation for different types of aircraft could not be established. 
The status and operation of State aircraft is excluded from the scope of applicability of 
international air law.46 The status of military aircraft is also unclearly determined by positive 
rules of international law, while only some fragmentary aspects can be find from different 
international treaties and even those are mostly negative, stating what does not apply to them 
                                                 
42 J. Wouters, S. Verhoeven. State Aircraft. Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, July 
2008, para. 6. 
43 See for example: the Geneva Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft (1948), 
the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the 
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), and the Montreal 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971). 
44 M. Milde. Essential Air and Space Law. International Air Law and ICAO. Eleven International 
Publishing: Utrecht 2008, p. 59; Chicago Convention. Annex 7, Foreword, p. 5. 
45 Ibid., p. 59. 
46 Ibid., p. 60. 
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or what are they not allowed to do.47 While there is quite much information in literature about 
the legal position of military aircraft during an armed conflict, there is very few international 
agreements that apply in a time of peace.48  
Since the beginning of aviation, States have not been open to debate over international 
regulation of State aircraft, because it was seen as a potential tool for belligerent activities.49 
No State wants to limit the advantage aircraft can give during an armed conflict or simply for 
national security reasons. Some scholars are in an opinion, that the Chicago convention should 
never be applicable to military aircraft because of the abovementioned reason of national 
security.50 However, the Chicago convention applies to aircraft from most of the States and 
amending it to be applicable to military aircraft as well is the most simple option to establish 
navigation rules for military aircraft in other areas than the high seas and the EEZ. 
The primary distinction under international law is made between civil and state aircraft. There 
are two approaches for that. First one defines all aircraft owned and operated by the 
government, including those operated by a public body for commercial purposes.51 Although, 
the scope of the definition is very wide, this approach is preferred because of its clarity and 
transparency.52 Another approach distinguishes aircraft on the basis of the purpose of their use, 
so if the aircraft is used for civil purposes then it is considered to be a civil aircraft.53 The latter 
definition would hence include the following aircraft as a state aircraft: aircraft of customs 
authorities, police aircraft, military aircraft, mail-carrying aircraft, coastal guard aircraft, search 
and rescue aircraft, disaster relief aircraft, aircraft for fire-fighting, scientific aircraft, and 
others.54 In any case, a military aircraft in the meaning of this paper is a state aircraft used by a 
government body for military purposes. 
The distinction between civil and military aircraft was made by States in an international 
instrument already in 1919 in the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation55 
(Paris Convention). According to Article 31 of the Paris Convention, a military aircraft is every 
                                                 
47 Ibid., p. 61. 
48 Ibid., p. 61. 
49 Ibid., p. 61. 
50 Wouters, Verhoeven, op. cit., para. 8. 
51 Ibid., para. 1. 
52 Ibid., para. 1. 
53 Ibid., para. 1. 
54 Ibid., para. 1. 
55 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation. Paris 13.10.1919, e.i.f. 1922. 
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aircraft that is commanded by a person in military service detailed for the purpose. According 
to latter convention, the legal framework that applies to military aircraft is also different than 
the one for civil aircraft. For example, Article 32 foresees that military aircraft cannot fly over 
another contracting State or land thereon without its authorization.  
In the past, a military aircraft was simply defined as an aircraft under the command of a military 
officer, later on the basis of its technical characteristics.56 With the influence of the Chicago 
convention and because of the dual use of aircraft, the actual use of an aircraft for military 
purposes became the main criterion to determine its type.57  
It is also possible to use analogy with the definition of a warship established in UNCLOS when 
defining what is a military aircraft.58 According to Article 29 of UNCLOS, a warship is:  
“a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such 
ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government 
of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned 
by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.” 
Accordingly, a military aircraft belongs to the armed forces of a State, has external marks to 
distinguish its nationality, is under the command of an officer appropriately commissioned by 
a government of a State, and is manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces 
discipline. However, this definition leaves out drones, since they are not manned by a crew, and 
has deficiencies when it comes to aircraft that does not belong directly to the military but are 
used in the military purposes. Military drones are used by some States almost on daily basis 
and there is no international convention signed to regulate their status and use. 
The Paris convention was superseded by the Chicago Convention where in Article 3(c) States 
kept the rule that prohibits foreign military aircraft to enter State territory without their special 
authorization. The Chicago Convention Article 3(d) establishes a rule that when States issue 
regulations for military aircraft, they must take into account the navigational safety of civil 
aircraft. This leaves an impression that States have considered the navigational safety for civil 
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aircraft to be more important than the regulation over navigation for military aircraft. The 
amendment for Article 3 bis to the Chicago convention that prohibits the use of force against 
civil aircraft in flight was adopted in response to the 1983 aviation tragedy where the Soviet air 
force shot down a Korean Airlines civil aircraft.59  
According to the Paris Convention Article 32, military aircraft are not allowed to fly over the 
territory of another State nor land thereon without a special authorization form that State. With 
this, from the inception of international air law, military aircraft were given a different status 
from the civil aircraft and it was restricting the freedom of operation in foreign sovereign 
airspace with making it a subject to an authorization from the State that would be overflown.60 
As already mentioned, States did not strive for regulating the navigation of State aircraft in 
international level, so the Article 32 of the Paris Convention might have been one of the most 
important aspects that the States had to agree on. 
While the Chicago Convention singles out the concept of state aircraft, it does not give a 
definition to the term.61 Article 3(b) of the convention only states that state aircraft are those 
used in military, customs and police services, but nothing more specific can be found. The 
examples in Article 3(b) cannot be taken as comprehensive list though, since State functions 
also include coastal guard, medical service, research and other, which should also be covered 
in the meaning of State aircraft.62  
The members of ICAO understood the potential that the military aircraft have in the concept of 
national defence, but also the advantage new technology could bring to a State and did not want 
to share it with others. The ICAO document Circular 330 highlighted that the fundamental 
requirement of each and every State is to be able to train and operate its State aircraft 
effectively,63 because there is a requirement that State aircraft would have guaranteed the right 
to access all airspace, within the limits of the specific operational needs, to enable the military, 
customs and police to perform the national defence, security and law enforcement missions that 
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are mandated by their States or by international agreements.64 When from the Circular 330 the 
States have an obligation to operate its state aircraft effectively, then accordingly, there is an 
obligation to operate military aircraft effectively. However, it is premature to conclude that 
using activated transponders goes under this obligation. 
There are certain characteristics that can be considered in their mutual combination and may 
help to determine the military nature of an aircraft, those are: 
• Design and technical characteristics of the aircraft are constructed exclusively for 
military combat; 
• The nationality and registration marks may define it as used in military service; 
• The ownership of the aircraft is by the State or by the military of the State; 
• The nature of the specific flight operation.65 
It is not reliable to define an aircraft as military solely on one of those characteristics, but all 
together they do help to find the answer.66 The wording of Article 3(b) however suggests, that 
the drafters might not have thought about the characteristics of the aircraft, but only the basic 
purpose of the use of that aircraft.67 Therefore, the way an airplane is used designates its type 
and determines if it is a military aircraft or not. 
The rules of international air law, including the obligation to use activated transponders, apply 
to civil aircraft and not to military aircraft. Then again, why are transponders so important in 
the meaning of the freedom of overflight and why should the obligation apply to military 
aircraft as well? This is the question that will be answered in the next subchapter.  
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1.3. Importance of transponders in the concept of freedom of overflight 
A transponder is a device for receiving and automatically transmitting a radio signal.68 At first, 
transponders were used by military authorities to identify friendly aircraft by transmitting a 
coded signal when interrogated by military radar.69 Aircraft use transponders to avoid collisions 
in the air and ensure the navigational safety. Military aircraft may switch off the transponders 
when they want to stay unnoticeable to others, but it can cause a threat of collision with civil 
airplanes who cannot see the military aircraft near them from their radars when the transponders 
are not used. Possible outcomes of flying with non-activated transponder or without a 
transponder include, inter alia, loss of communication, airspace infringement, loss of separation 
and inefficient planning and conflict detection by air traffic controllers.70 The consequences 
might have an effect on the pilot as well as other nearby aircraft. 
Reports about aircraft flying without activated transponders have increased considerably in 
recent years.71 In the Baltic Sea area, these airplanes are mostly Russian, but some sources claim 
that Sweden has identified aircraft with inactive transponders that belong to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Association (NATO) also.72 Russian spokesmen have too given notice that military 
aircraft from NATO Member States do not use activated transponders when flying near their 
border.73  
To give an approximate understanding about the frequency of how often military aircraft have 
not used activated transponders, Estonian Minister of Defence has claimed, for example, that 
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within the first eight months in 2015 Estonian Air Forces have used the help of NATO’s fighter 
jets for over 100 times to identify Russian airplanes that flew without active transponders.74 
This is a huge number of times when civil airplanes could have been in a threat of collision with 
those aircraft that were not detected by them.  
In December 2014, Russian aircraft and a civil airplane that was starting from the airport of 
Copenhagen got too close to each other and there was an actual risk of collision.75 Swedish 
officials said, that this had been the second time of that year, when a situation that kind had 
happened and the Swedish Defence Minister had commented to the press after the incident: 
"This is serious. This is inappropriate. This is outright dangerous when you turn off the 
transponder.”76 The incident was widely covered by media and the act of switching off 
transponders was broadly condemned. The same source refers to the Sweden’s air force chief’s 
claim that this had been the second incident of that kind near Copenhagen in 2014.77  
In June 2017, a Russian military aircraft came within a few feet of a U.S. Air Force 
reconnaissance jet above the Baltic Sea and risked a collision, while the Russian jet once again 
was not using activated transponders.78 Pictures of the situation were released in media where 
it can be seen that the two aircraft really were dangerously close to each other.79 It can be argued 
if letter situation was intentional by the Russian jet or not. However, it can still be concluded, 
that failure to use activated transponders is a threat to civil as well as military aircraft. If a 
collision would take place between two military aircraft between different States, then in 
addition to the loss of lives of the crew on those aircraft, it could lead to tensions between the 
States and even to more serious consequences.  
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These are only some of the examples of the reported and publicly known cases that got wider 
coverage by the publicity and when there was a real threat of collision that could have been 
avoided when transponders would have been activated on the military aircraft.  
When it comes to navigational safety at sea, it is conceivable to draw parallels between the 
regulations for vessels and aircraft in some certain areas like regulation for reducing collision 
risk with a reporting system. While the civil liability for causing collisions by vessels at sea is 
not firmly fixed, the breach of the regulations is commonly made an offence under the criminal 
law of the flag State.80 For avoiding international incidents it is vital to create an international 
agreement where the liability and consequences for creating a threat to navigational safety are 
fixed. Series of regulations that have been made to prevent collisions at sea are all principally 
concerned with the conduct and movements of vessels.81 There is a time and need for creating 
regulations for the safety of military aircraft also and making the use of activated transponders 
an obligation under international law.  
The management of marine traffic has become more comprehensive in time, but it was unlikely 
to reach the precision of air traffic control.82 In 1994 the mandatory reporting systems were 
introduced, according to which the vessels had to give their position, identity and other relevant 
information, this was to make sure that when there was a risk of collision, the shore authority 
would be able to warn the ship and take necessary action.83 Transponders are used for similar 
purposes, since they automatically receive and send out information about their location and 
are used to avoid collisions and guarantee the safety of navigation.  
After the convention International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea84 entered into 
force in 1977 the observance of traffic separation schemes became mandatory and the general 
number of collisions at sea declined significantly.85 For air navigation traffic separation 
schemes are called flight information regions that are designated by the ICAO and they only 
control the civil aviation. They would be difficult to set and agree on for controlling military 
aviation as well and considering the air-routes they even might be unreasonable. The use of 
                                                 
80 Churchill, Lowe. op cit., p. 267. 
81 Ibid, p. 267. 
82 Ibid, p. 268. 
83 Ibid., p. 268. 
84 The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. International Maritime Organization. 
London 20.10.1972, e.i.f. 15.07.1977. 
85 Churchill, Lowe. op. cit., p. 267. 
22 
 
transponders would be simple enough manner for avoiding collisions and other dangerous 
situations during navigation. 
Next to the threat of collision with civil and military airplanes, there is another problem that 
comes up and it concerns the resources that are used to identify the aircraft that are approaching 
the coastal State’s airspace. States who have to send out fighter planes to identify other airplanes 
without activated transponders are using great amounts of money for their actions, considering 
that a flight hour with a fighter plane may cost tens of thousands of dollars.86 That is an immense 
amount of resources that could be used for other ways to promote the security in the Baltic Sea 
area.  
There is no treaty concluded that gives military aircraft obligations in time of peace. There is 
no direct obligation under international law for military aircraft to send out information about 
an airplane’s location with a transponder in international air space as similar obligation exists 
for vessels, but it is considered to be ethical that military aircraft make way for civil flight 
traffic.87 There is an obligation for civil aircraft to use activated transponders, furthermore, even 
the type of the transponder that must be used on aircraft can be regulated by the ICAO.88 For 
creating an effective obligation for military aircraft, the States must create a treaty or a 
convention where they set the specific rules and consequences in cases of irregularities by the 
member States. 
It is stated in the Chicago convention Article 3(d) that when States are regulating the rules of 
state aircraft under their national laws, they must have due regard for the safety of navigation 
of civil aircraft. This is probably the only obligation for military aircraft under international law 
in time of peace. The use of activated transponders helps the civil aircraft to see military aircraft 
and therefore it is a simple and effective method to guarantee the safety of civil aviation from 
a threat of collision with military aircraft. All in all, this means there are three persuasive 
reasons to create the latter obligation: air navigation safety, resources and ethics.  
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In the concept of international aviation law, transponders are not directly limiting the freedom 
of overflight, but have an importance as a safety measure used for the protection of aircraft 
using the right of freedom of navigation and overflight. Regarding this result, it is important to 
analyze if the coastal State has more right to lay an obligation for foreign aircraft to use activated 
transponders in their EEZ. This question will be answered in the next paragraph, where it will 
be analyzed under the rules of international law and also under the national laws of the States 
in the Baltic Sea region. 
While the use of unmanned aircraft has increased remarkably, numerous types of drones suggest 
that some of them should also be affected by the obligation to use an activated transponder. The 
next paragraph shows the status and regulation of aviation navigation for aerial drones and 
analyzes if the coastal State has more rights to regulate the navigation of drones then aircraft in 
its EEZ. 
 
1.4. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), also called as pilotless aircraft, remotely piloted vehicle, 
remotely piloted aircraft, remotely operated aircraft, and simply drones, are controlled remotely 
by human operators or are in some part autonomous and guided by a computer program.89 
Drones were originally developed for intelligence purposes, but are also widely used for 
targeted attacks and now more than 40 States have the technology.90 Since the use of drones is 
growing every day, it is important to stop on the question about their status under the present 
problem and under international law and determine how different are the regulations for UAV 
from the regulation for aircraft and if it has influence on obligation to use transponders. 
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The use of UAVs in military operations has grown ever since they were first used.91 UAVs are 
used in military primarily for two reasons: for surveillance and intelligence purposes, and as 
weapons platforms.92 UN has even used the UAVs in peacekeeping operations.93 The use of 
drones is generally legal under international law.94 Taking into account that Intelligence 
gathering in EEZ needs a consent from coastal State, then it might not be necessary to sign a 
special treaty to make intelligence gathering drones to wear a transponder, since the coastal 
State can regulate the drone’s navigation in the EEZ to some extent.  
Article 8 of the Chicago Convention explains the regulation about pilotless aircraft and gives 
an obligation to ask prior permission to overfly the territory of another State, also, the UAV 
must avoid causing a threat to civil aviation. UAV are currently mostly used for military 
purposes and while they are often equipped with devices for surveillance or combat, their 
overflight is already prohibited under Chicago Convention Article 3(c).95 Use of surveillance 
drones in the EEZ can also be a violation of UNCLOS, since surveillance activities are 
prohibited without the consent of the coastal State.96 Therefore, the coastal State has a right to 
regulate the navigation of surveillance drones to some extent. 
It is believed that if an unmanned drone should enjoy navigational rights, it will be bound by 
the conditions associated with those rights.97 The basic idea of the rule in customary law is that 
passage must not be prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security of the coastal State.98 
Passage of a foreign ship is considered to violate this principle of freedom of navigation,99 if it 
is carrying out research or survey activities.100 Furthermore, peacetime intelligence gathering 
inside the territory of another state is considered unlawful per se.101  
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According to UNCLOS Article 245, a coastal State has the exclusive right to regulate, authorize 
and conduct Marine scientific research in their territorial sea and it shall be conducted only with 
the express consent of the coastal State. Even though, the rights of a coastal State are not as 
strong in the EEZ, they still have control on intelligence activities. According to Article 246(2) 
of UNCLOS, there has to be a consent from coastal State for conducting research in the EEZ 
and continental shelf. Therefore, because it is difficult to identify when the UAV performs 
intelligence gathering and when not, foreign intelligence UAV needs a permission from the 
coastal State to fly over the EEZ. 
However, is there a right to use force against a surveillance drone and should it be treated 
differently than piloted aircraft? When it comes to armed conflicts, then shooting down a drone 
can be considered less horrible action than shooting down an aircraft simply because the loss 
of human lives is less tolerated than loss of a machine or equipment. However, it is not simple 
to debate that international law would give different protection to aircraft considering their 
registration and to human life regardless of nationality.102 
While the coastal State has some control over the navigation and overflight of intelligence 
UAV, when the UAVs are used as weapon platforms or in targeted attacks, they might have the 
same regulation regarding navigation as other military aircraft and warships and coastal State 
does not have as much abilities to regulate their navigation. However, when UAV is used for 
military purposes, they must consider that according to UNCLOS Article 301 States must 
refrain from any threat of use of force against any State while exercising their rights and 
performing their duties. It is also noted in the Preamble of UNCLOS that the convention will 
promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans. 
While the coastal State has a right to approve or disapprove the navigation of an intelligence 
gathering UAV in the EEZ, the legal regime for manned military aircraft is most likely out of 
the reach of a coastal State to regulate on its own. What exactly are the rights and obligations 
of a coastal State whose EEZ has been used for freedom of overflight and what rights and 
obligations do other States have who are using this freedom? The next chapter of this paper will 
analyze these questions.  
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II RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF STATES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING THE FREEDOM OF 
OVERFLIGHT 
States have different rights and obligations under customary international law, UNCLOS, and 
other international instruments that may affect the States while exercising the freedom of 
overflight and the coastal States potential rights to regulate other State’s aircraft while using 
that freedom. During UNCLOS negotiations, the States worked towards the balance between 
the rights and interests of a coastal State on one side, that included the resources and security 
interests, and of the rights and duties of other States and the international community as a whole 
on the other side that included the navigation rights.103  
The rights and obligations of States with regard to aircraft in the airspace above the EEZ are 
rather obliquely referred to in UNCLOS and it gives only somewhat guidance about the rights 
of third States vis-à-vis the aviation jurisdiction of the coastal State in the EEZ.104  
For determining the legality and possibility of the establishment of a potential treaty obligation 
for military aircraft to use activated transponders is allowed under international law, relevant 
part of State’s rights and obligations under international law will be analyzed in present chapter 
more closely.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 S. Rosenne, J. Gebhard. Conferences on the Law of the Sea. Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, May 2008, para. 38. 
104 Hailbronner, op. cit., p. 503. 
27 
 
 
2.1. Rights of a State under international law 
2.1.1. Sovereignty of the sea and airspace  
The concept of sovereignty is the foundation of international air law.105 Question about the 
obligation to use activated transponders is connected to the sovereignty of States that are parties 
to the conflict. On one hand, a military aircraft of one State uses its sovereign right to fly over 
the EEZ while having the sovereign right of its flag State not to use a transponder when the 
States has not accepted this obligation under international law, and on the other hand, the other 
State uses its sovereign right to give laws regulating the obligation for aircraft to give prior 
notification when approaching the State airspace.  
The principle of State sovereignty has been important in many disciplines, including 
international law and international relations, already in time of the Westphalian treaty in 
1648.106 The concept of territorial sovereignty, although, is a modern one and distinguishes the 
international dimension of sovereignty from domestic sovereignty.107 In the international 
sphere, the activities by sovereigns to keep the safety of the community include actions that 
may overlap and possibly infringe upon the sovereignty of other communities.108 As the same 
way the freedom of overflight used improperly can cause a threat to others who enjoy that 
freedom.  
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the sovereign power is „the international independence 
of a [S]tate, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign 
dictation.”109 The Chicago convention does not apply to military aircraft, as it is excluded in 
Article 3. The members of the Chicago convention have used their sovereign right to take the 
obligation for their State aircraft to guarantee the safety of civil aircraft while flying. Although, 
state aircraft have to consider with the navigation safety rules in order to guarantee the safe 
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flight of civil aircraft, as it is set under international law. In the meaning of State sovereignty, 
it is important to note that States are sovereign to regulate the navigation rules on their own, 
however, only on their own sovereign territory.  
Under international law, sovereignty can be understood as a higher normative with a mission 
to restrain States subjective politics and therefore the concept of sovereignty is equated with 
the set of rights and obligations granted to States.110 In the context of this thesis, sovereignty 
has importance in two aspects, first, because of the sovereignty States have over its airspace, 
and second, because of the sovereign right of each State to choose which treaty to sign and what 
obligations to take on itself. 
Sovereignty represents the ability to make authoritative decisions111 and therefore is important 
to take into consideration whenever arguing over the possibility of signing a multilateral treaty 
about limiting State’s own rights and obligations. While it is important for the States to keep 
the right for freedom of overflight, there has to be a general understanding if the obligation to 
use activated transponders is a limitation to this freedom, and when yes, then is it justified under 
international law. 
There is an obligation under international law to respect the territorial sovereignty of another 
State. This was also stressed in the Corfu Channel case, where the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) underlined that respect for territorial sovereignty is the essential foundation of 
international relations between independent States.112 From the Corfu case it was clear that the 
territorial sovereignty is so important that is must be respected even when the violation is made 
in good intentions.113 It is not a clear parallel to make when claiming that the failure to use an 
activated transponder would be disrespectful to the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State, 
but it is not an unrealistic thought either, because it is disrespectful for other aircraft. 
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Territorial sovereignty is also emphasized in UNCLOS Article 2 that is about the legal status 
of the territorial sea and basically establishes that States have sovereignty over their territorial 
sea and this sovereignty extends to the airspace over the territorial sea. Accordingly, the 
importance of the territorial sovereignty has been clear and well-established in international 
society and from that concept airspace sovereignty evolved as well. 
The ICJ stated in the Nicaragua case that the ‘unauthorized overflight of a State’s territory by 
aircraft belonging to or under the control of the government of another state’ directly infringes 
the territorial sovereignty of the overflown State.114 This is a general observation and should be 
tempered by noting that if such an incursion had been caused by navigational error or other 
intentional circumstances, its wrongfulness could have been precluded on the grounds of 
distress or force majeure115 that is explained in Draft Articles on State Responsibility. While as 
intense act as the unlawful overflight of a State territory is a direct violation of its territorial 
sovereignty, it is unlikely that a simple act as failure to use activated transponders in the EEZ 
could be considered as a minor violation or even as a threat to territorial sovereignty of the 
coastal State. 
The sovereignty of the sea is one of the three cornerstones of international law of the sea, next 
to freedom of the sea and the common heritage of mankind.116 Historically, the concept of 
sovereignty over the sea, however, composes of two primary rights that are related to navigation 
and fishing.117 Accordingly, as it is a part of the freedom of the sea, the freedom of navigation 
is a part of the sovereignty of the sea and represents an important part of international law of 
the sea. The extent of sovereignty over the sea depends on the coastal State’s needs and capacity 
of control over it.118 However, the extent of territorial sea can also affect State’s capacity. The 
capacity to have control over the sea could be the reason that affected some States to claim a 
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narrower territorial sea than 12 nm. The geographical position also has an impact, for example, 
Jordan’s claim for the territorial sea is only 3 nm wide.119  
One of the principle of public international air law recognizes each State’s absolute sovereignty 
over the air above its territory and territorial waters and this includes the right to impose its 
jurisdiction over such airspace.120 Hence, all States may require any foreign aircraft in its 
airspace, even if only for a brief transit, to comply with their air transport regulations, inter alia 
for those concerning navigation.121 It would be reasonable to presume, that an aircraft has to 
follow those rules that also regulate the procedure of entering the air space. While State relies 
on the sovereignty, it has to follow the international treaty obligations it has assumed in the 
interest of safe air transport.122  
Sovereignty of airspace was first settled in Paris Conference where the Paris Convention was 
drafted.  The outcome of the Convention showed an active backing for complete and exclusive 
sovereignty of the air space.123 According to current public law regulations, the part of the air 
space above a particular State’s land and sea territory is considered to be seen as that State’s air 
space124 and that State has exclusive power over it. The meaning of sovereignty of airspace that 
was established in the Paris Convention was relied on when drafting future conventions as well.  
The Chicago Convention continued to emphasize the importance of air sovereignty and used 
the first article from the Paris Convention almost as it was: “The contracting States recognize 
that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”125  
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States are prohibited to have any rights in the airspace other than their own, because of the 
formal eminence of the principle of sovereignty.126 States have no right to set regulations in the 
sovereign territory of another State. 
During armed conflicts in the beginning of the 20th century, the question about airspace 
sovereignty became important. If a neutral State allows a belligerent to enter the neutral airspace 
and conduct intelligence operations or combat operations against their opponent, then it might 
have an effect on the neutrality of the neutral State in the eyes of other belligerents and the 
international community.127 Because of the previously described possibility, neutral States took 
a position that they had complete sovereignty over their airspace and that entry by a belligerent 
aircraft would be a violation of their neutrality, and also of their sovereignty.128 The decisions 
of neutral States thus had a great impact on the development of international law in these 
matters, since it was also decided by the neutral States that they had a right to prevent the entry 
of a belligerent aircraft, even with the use of force, if necessary.129 Furthermore, it was often 
considered that force could be used without prior warning.130 This reflects the States 
understanding about how important the territorial sovereignty really was. 
The actions in the time of conflict had an impact on the regulations there were developed after 
it. Customary law in regard to sovereignty of airspace arose from the treatment of belligerent 
aircraft by neutrals during World War I131 when it reflected the concern of the world for seeking 
protection from hostile intrusions.132 Military aircraft were not allowed to enter foreign airspace 
without express consent,133 already in the beginning of the development of international 
aviation law, since it was seen as a threat to national security and the State had also sovereign 
power to decide who to let into its sovereign territory.  
The letter list shows that overall the freedom of overflight was accepted already between the 
two World Wars even though it had different approaches in the limits of it. It also shows that 
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there has always been different attitude towards civil and military aircraft in regard of the 
freedom of overflight. 
Current regulations in public international law foresee that the part of the airspace that is above 
State’s land and sea territory is considered as that State’s airspace.134 The airspace over the 
territorial sea is thus the airspace of the coastal State. States have complete, exclusive and all-
encompassing sovereignty in their airspace.135 According to this approach, the right for a coastal 
State to decide over the legislation regarding the military aircraft, is limited to its territory.  
The previously named fact that States have sovereignty only over their territory is another clear 
proof that States must cooperate when creating an obligation for the safety in the whole region 
and over the territorial waters of the Baltic Sea. It is one of the cases, the complete and exclusive 
sovereignty should be left beside either through voluntariness or duress136 and to make a 
compromise between the sovereignty of the airspace and the safety of aviation, naming the 
safety of aviation navigation as the more important. This again reflects one of the parts of State 
sovereignty, that States have a right to decide which treaty obligations to take. 
2.1.2. The principle of free consent 
International law is based on the consent of the States. When talking about establishing an 
international obligation, it is not possible to overlook at the principle of free consent. Vienna 
Convention on Law of Treaties reflects the customary law in this matter while stating that: 
“Noting that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule 
are universally recognized”137 As already mentioned in previous subchapter, States have a 
sovereign right to choose which treaties they wish to sign and that gives them a choice to choose 
which international obligations to take.   
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The consent of States plays a central role in developing international legal obligations.138 As 
the Permanent Court of International Justice stated already in the Lotus case:  
“The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to 
regulate the relations between these CO-existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be 
presumed.”139 
States own free will to take obligations under international law is therefore a very important 
aspect to consider while analyzing the legality of a potential treaty obligation. A treaty 
obligation is binding to a State only when it has given its consent.140 In case of multilateral 
agreements there are both an individual and a collective dimension in creating a binding treaty 
obligation.141  Therefore, in order to create a legally binding international obligation for military 
aircraft to fly with activated transponder over the Baltic Sea and to make it efficient enough to 
serve its purpose of safety of aerial navigation, all States in the Baltic Sea area must give their 
consent to sign the treaty that establishes the obligation. 
2.1.3. State’s right to create security or air defence identification zones 
Another one of State’s rights is a right under UNCLOS to establish air defence zones to ensure 
their rights over the marine resources in the EEZ and for other reasons allowed under UNCLOS. 
Numerous national claims to non-contiguous, but adjacent, zones for special purposes were 
produced by States in the 20th century.142 Maritime identification zones, air defence zones and 
security zones have different name and purpose, but the basic idea behind them is similar – to 
create a certain area beyond the territorial sea that has limitations to navigation for other State’s 
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vessels and aircraft for security or other reasons. Therefore, in this paper these zones will be 
considered as air defence identification zones (ADIZ). 
It is arguable whether establishing an ADIZ beyond the territorial sea of a coastal State is 
permissible as long as it does not have an influence on commercial navigation.143 Establishing 
an ADIZ for the purposes of identifying vessels and aircraft, however, has gained acceptance 
according to the State practice and reflect the common interest of States in enhancing maritime 
domain awareness.144 
Innocent passage was already included in a convention in 1919 when the Paris Convention 
adopted this right that was clearly limiting the force of the absolute principle of sovereignty.145 
Back then, the right of innocent passage was restricted to state aircraft and scheduled air 
services above prohibited areas, however these services were referred to as bilateral agreements 
at the time.146 Later, the Chicago Convention brought out some clear specific attributes of that 
sovereignty.147 Article 2 of the Convention reiterates the generally recognized principle of 
sovereignty over the airspace above the territorial sea,148 making it possible for the coastal State 
to create ADIZ in its territorial sea.   
If a State declares an ADIZ, it usually asks aircraft to identify itself and to give the State 
information on its flight plan.149 This could lead to the possibility for the coastal State to 
obligate military aircraft to use activated transponders in some specific zones they foresee it, 
however, this would not solve the problem in the whole Baltic Sea. The establishment of an 
ADIZ can be justified with security considerations when the coastal State needs to protect itself 
from a sudden attack from a high speed aircraft and thus it is understood that the limitation of 
the freedom of navigation as a freedom of the high seas is not justified when the aircraft flies 
in lateral passage and does not represent an immediate threat to the security of the coastal 
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State.150 When a foreign military aircraft flies directly towards the coastal State without having 
a permission for it, it can be seen as a threat in obvious reasons. 
While these special ADIZ represent claims to extra-territorial jurisdiction they are not 
necessarily in conflict with general international law and these zones can even be created with 
a convention by several States as a cooperation.151 However, in case these zones include the 
application of powers of punishment or prevention towards foreign vessels or aircraft, such 
zones could be incompatible with the status of waters beyond the limit of the territorial sea.152 
Under the application of punishment is meant the right and possibility to perform law 
enforcement in cases of violations. Even if such rights would be discussed on for including in 
a treaty, it gives States power outside their territory and this is against the principle of territorial 
sovereignty. 
However, on the other hand, if the declaration of declaring an ADIZ does not include any kind 
of enforcement, there seems to be no reason to declare the zone at all.153 The purpose of creating 
an ADIZ is to stop any aircraft, foreign and domestic, to enter the zone and without enforcement 
measures, it would be difficult to meet this purpose. The exercising of lawful policing would 
also guarantee the legality of these zones.154  
The latter enforcement requirement is fulfilled by the UN. The freedom of overflight can be 
restricted in a certain area also by a no-fly order issued by the UN Security Council.155 These 
orders may prohibit States to use parts of or the whole of their airspace above their own territory 
in case of an armed conflict or for reasons of humanitarian intervention for the purposes of 
preventing or diminishing aggression.156 With the permission of the UN Security Council the 
UN military aircraft can enforce the no-fly orders,157 guaranteeing the exercising of lawful 
policing on those areas. 
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There are number of States, including Canada, France, Japan, the United States of America, 
and Republic of Korea, that have established standing ADIZ.158 However, there is no treaty 
provisions that regulate the establishment or operating of these zones per se and these unilateral 
claims indicate that the right to declare an ADIZ may be recognized as a right under customary 
international law.159 
It is difficult to see how creating such defence zones in the Baltic Sea area solely on the purpose 
of safety of navigation would be possible and reasonable. Most likely they would not help to 
solve the problem with non-activated transponders, on the contrary, it could create more 
tensions between the States. However, States have more rights under international law that 
could give them right to regulate the freedom of overflight and they will be analyzed in the next 
subchapter. 
2.1.4. Other State’s rights under international law regarding the freedom of overflight 
By the expansion of maritime zones, the principle of the freedom of navigation has been 
limited,160 by giving coastal States jurisdiction to limit the navigation of other States in the EEZ 
in certain conditions. As a result of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, new maritime 
zones, including the EEZ, were agreed on. States were able to make compromises on different 
rights and obligations regarding those zones. Some consider the EEZ as an evolving concept 
where the rights and jurisdictions of States are only partly fixed by conventions.161 
According to UNCLOS Article 56, the coastal State enjoys sovereign rights in the EEZ only 
for managing the natural resources,162 jurisdiction regarding the establishment of artificial 
islands, installations and structures163 and “other rights and duties provided for in this 
Convention.”164 Article 58(1) refers that those other rights are connected to lawful uses of the 
sea that are related to the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines. 
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However, it would be early to conclude that since State’s rights in the EEZ are connected to the 
operation of aircraft then it includes the coastal States right to regulate the use of transponders 
or the obligation for other States to use them either.  
UNCLOS commentaries clears the issue by two different approaches. Firstly, Article 58 
establishes the rights and duties of States other than the coastal State and have due regard to the 
rights and duties of the coastal States in the EEZ.165 Secondly, at the time of the third session 
of the conference, paragraph 4 of Article 58 suggests that the States must comply with laws and 
regulations of the coastal States that are adopted under the UNCLOS and it does not include 
the security interests of the coastal States.166 The use of activated transponders, however, is not 
a security interest of a single coastal State, but affects the safety of all civil and military aviation 
and all States. 
At first glance it seems that the coastal State’s rights in the EEZ are mostly concerned about the 
environmental safety, natural resources in seabed and subsoil, artificial structures and not about 
navigation, but to guarantee the safety of those areas, some restrictions to navigation may be 
set.  
According to the commentaries of UNCLOS, the purpose of Article 56 is to point out the 
general nature of the rights, jurisdiction and duties that the States have in the EEZ.167 Coastal 
State jurisdiction in the EEZ covers activities that are regulated under the so called “other 
rights” in Article 56, those are about marine pollution, scientific research, offshore installations 
and drilling activities, fishing activities, submarine cables and pipelines, and also navigation.168 
Accordingly, States do have jurisdiction over navigation and overflight in the EEZ in some 
extent. 
The coastal State has immense jurisdiction in regulating the navigation in the territorial sea, but 
in only certain domains in the EEZ. The United States of America considers, for example, that 
the EEZ regime set in UNCLOS does not permit the States to limit non-resource related 
activities in the EEZ at all, including such activities as task force maneuvering, flight 
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operations, and military exercises.169 However, the United States of America is not even a party 
to UNCLOS and may not use the treaty provisions for its self-interest.  
It should be considered if establishing a contiguous zone would give a State more rights to limit 
the freedom of navigation and overflight. UNCLOS Article 33 gives coastal State a right to 
create special zone contiguous to its territorial sea, where the State can exercise control over 
the sea area up to 24 nautical miles as measure from the baselines where the territorial sea is 
measured. However, UNCLOS Article 33(1)(a) allows the coastal State to take measures in the 
continuous zone only regarding customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws, so the coastal 
State does not have any direct rights regarding the limitation of navigation for other State’s 
vessels or aircraft. When the primary purpose of a coastal State’s regulation is connected to the 
areas pointed out in Article 33(1)(a), limitations to navigation could potentially be made, but 
they cannot be the primary purpose of the regulations. Since international airspace starts from 
right after the territorial sea, then regardless if the State has claimed a contiguous zone, the legal 
aspects of the freedom of overflight are the same in the contiguous zone as in whole extent of 
the EEZ.  
UNCLOS does not plainly stipulate what legal regime should be applied with regard to 
activities that are not unequivocally regulated under Article 56(1)(a).170 Also, altogether it is 
not clear whether the list of a coastal state's jurisdictional rights with regard to the uses 
mentioned in Article 56(1)(b) can be taken as an exhaustive enumeration, making possible any 
other exercise of jurisdiction in the EEZ.171 Since Article 56(1)(c) gives the coastal State 
jurisdiction over “other rights and duties provided for in this Convention,” it rather seems that 
the list in previous provision is not exhaustive. 
It is evident that there is imbalance between the rights of a coastal State and the rights of other 
States, because only the freedoms of navigation and overflight limit the sovereignty of a coastal 
State effectively.172 However, the rights of a coastal State are not absolute, since UNCLOS 
Articles 55, 56(2), and 58 expressly provides the due regard to other rights and duties of other 
States.173 Accordingly, all States have an obligation to respect other State’s rights and duties 
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when using the sea. This obligation and others will be analyzed more closely in the next 
subchapter. 
 
2.2. Obligations of a State under international law 
2.2.1. Obligation to due take account of the rights and duties of other States  
The obligation that has an effect on State sovereignty is the obligation to due take account of 
the rights and duties of other States. While there is not much to discuss about, it is still important 
to bring out one of the basic obligations that UNCLOS foresees for States and it has a wider 
effect on potential future treaties than it might seem. The basic idea behind this obligation is 
that States must respect other State’s rights and duties under UNCLOS while they are using 
their own. 
Articles 56 and 58 of UNCLOS impose mutually the obligation of the coastal State to due take 
into account the rights and duties of other States and also that other States must take into account 
the rights and duties of the coastal State.174 The idea behind UNCLOS is that the assignment of 
resources to the coastal State should not prejudice the participation of other States to still use 
that area and continue to enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight.175 Articles 56 and 58 
reflect the compromise between the naval powers who stood for the freedom of navigation and 
overflight and the coastal States who wanted a more extensive jurisdiction over the marine 
resources. 
2.2.2. Obligation to identify yourself when approaching the border of another State 
The obligation to due take into account the rights and obligations of a coastal State leads to a 
milder form of the same obligation that reflects in the obligation to have respect for the coastal 
State. The obligation to identify itself is indirectly regulated under international law while 
Article 58(3) provides States with an obligation to comply with the laws and regulations 
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adopted by the coastal State.176 Although, Article 58(3) does not enlarge the regulatory 
authority of the coastal State nor limits the freedom of other States,177 States can rely on this 
provision to establish an obligation under national law to identify itself to vessels and aircraft 
that approach the coast.  This gives importance to the potential treaty between States to regulate 
the freedom of overflight and its limitations for safety in a more specific way. 
State may give an obligation for the aircraft to identify itself before approaching its airspace, 
although, it has some infirmities. When States may require the approaching military aircraft to 
identify itself, it is troublesome to see how enforcement measures, like interception of foreign 
aircraft that are passing through restricted zones, and prosecution of their pilots for not 
following a prescribed route or to file flight plans, can be defended under customary 
international law.178 This problem would again be solved with the treaty between States that 
puts an obligation to use activated transponders, so there is no need to ask an aircraft to identify 
itself again when approaching the coastal State and the enforcement measures might not be 
even needed.  
2.2.3. Other State’s obligations under international law 
Following the belief that the State is made for people and not the opposite, the State has an 
obligation to protect its citizens. The protection of a state's vital security interests against 
imminent dangers requiring immediate reaction, however, is a matter not regulated by the 
Convention and, therefore, not included in the scope of mere "flag state duties," precluding a 
state from taking enforcement action in its airspace.179 The danger to vital security interests 
must be evident, leaving a coastal state no other choice than immediate action if irreparable 
damage is to be avoided.180  
The responsibility to protect principle was first presented in the report made by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, according to their report The 
Responsibility to Protect, sovereignty gave a State the right to control its affairs, and also 
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conferred that the State has primary responsibility for protecting the people within its borders.181 
Accordingly, a State has to protect its citizens that are traveling on a civil aircraft that might be 
collided with a military aircraft that has not activated its transponders and thus is “invisible” 
for that civil aircraft. A State has an obligation under international law to take measures for 
protecting the civilian aviation as well as possible. 
States also have to use the sea in peaceful purposes and this applies also in the EEZ.182 The 
general obligation comes from UNCLOS Article 301 that puts States an obligation to refrain 
from the use of force against any State while exercising rights and performing duties under 
UNCLOS. Therefore, States have an obligation to guarantee that military aircraft under their 
command are not posing a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the 
coastal State. 
The rights and restrictions about the freedom of navigation may also appear in other sources 
than UNCLOS, for example, in the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. When 
the Security Council Resolution S/RES/1540, arguably, allows States to limit the transit of 
weapons of mass destruction and some States take that as an authorization to establish 
legislation for limiting the innocent passage and freedom of overflight regime,183 it is very 
questionable. States cannot unilaterally limit the freedom of navigation and overflight in the 
EEZ either.  
Innocent passage is considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the 
coastal state if a ship engages in the launching, landing, or taking on board of any aircraft, as 
set in Article 19(2)(e).184 Therefore, the aircraft should have a prior permission from the coastal 
State to fly over the territorial sea. Innocent passage does not embrace the right of overflight 
thus, the passage of aircraft will be subject to the coastal state's consent.185 Even more, 
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recognition of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone could imply authority over movement of 
aircraft with restrictions in respect to overflight.186  
In any event, when it comes to State’s obligations, State responsibility has to be considered. 
Customary law rules of State responsibility are reflected in Draft Articles of Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.187 If a State violates its obligation under international 
law, it is conducting an internationally wrongful act and is responsible for those actions.188 
UNCLOS has an Article that allows the State’s to change the regulations of UNCLOS by inter 
se agreements, however, it is prohibited to conclude those treaties in some certain areas. If 
freedom of navigation and overflight belongs with those restricted areas, will be analyzed as 
follows. 
 
2.4. UNCLOS Art 311(3) limitations to create treaty obligations 
The Baltic Sea meets the definition of a semi-enclosed sea in Article 122 of UNCLOS, under 
what is meant a “sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the 
ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal States.“ UNCLOS has a certain obligation for the coastal 
States that are located around such seas: an obligation to cooperate with each other while 
exercising their rights and performing their duties under UNCLOS.189 However, Article 123 
that establishes that obligation has specifications about what areas exactly should the States 
cooperate at and those are about marine resources,190 marine environment,191 and the Area.192 
According to UNCLOS commentaries, proposals were made for maintaining the freedom of 
navigation and overflight in the closed or semi-closed seas and in straits connecting those seas 
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with open ocean.193 However, these proposals were not accepted.194 Consequently, there is no 
obligation for the States surrounding a semi-enclosed sea to cooperate about other rights and 
obligations that arise from UNCLOS, including the freedom of navigation and overflight, so it 
cannot be used as justification for signing a treaty about limiting the freedom of overflight. 
Furthermore, Article 311(3) can even be an explicit prohibition for a cooperation to limit that 
freedom.  
Since the obligation to use activated transponders is seen as a limitation to the freedom of 
navigation and overflight that is a right provided in UNCLOS, Article 311 could be the biggest 
obstacle to set that kind of a limitation with a treaty. While the Article allows to sign treaties to 
modify the provisions of UNCLOS when it has effect only on themselves195, there are several 
strict conditions to consider. Firstly, article 311(2) considers the treaties that have been signed 
before the completion of UNCLOS, appointing that: 
“This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from 
other agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment by 
other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this 
Convention.” 
Furthermore, paragraph 3 of Article 311 establishes concrete limits to future treaties that may 
be concluded to restrict the rights and obligations from UNCLOS, stating that: 
“Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the operation 
of provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to the relations between them, provided that 
such agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from which is incompatible with the 
effective execution of the object and purpose of this Convention, and provided further that such 
agreements shall not affect the application of the basic principles embodied herein, and that the 
provisions of such agreements do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights 
or the performance of their obligations under this Convention.“ 
The purpose of Article 311 is to determine the relations between UNCLOS and international 
agreements that are made for dealing with the same issues as in the UNCLOS.196 While the goal 
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of the provision is to prevent future conflict between the UNCLOS and international 
agreements, Article 311 clarifies, to what extent is derogation from the rights and obligations 
from UNCLOS allowed.197 The third paragraph of Article 311 regulates the overall 
permissibility of inter se agreements.198 While Art 311(3) commonly allows modifications or 
suspensions, it sets the same conditions as in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Articles 41(1)(b) and 58(1)(b).199 Accordingly, multilateral treaty between the parties of the 
convention is not prohibited when the modification (Article 41(1)(b)) or suspension (Article 
58(1)(b)) in question is not prohibited by the convention itself. 
UNCLOS nor its commentaries have no reference to the fact that the freedom of navigation is 
an unlimited right. However, it is said that no State may validly purport to subject the 
superjacent airspace beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea to its sovereignty.200 This rule 
comes from Article 89 of UNCLOS, but it applies to the EEZ also.201 Therefore, it is vital to 
evaluate, if giving an obligation to use activated transponders is a way coastal State establishes 
its jurisdiction over the EEZ or is it just a measure of safety that is agreed by all neighboring 
States and does not directly limit the freedom of overflight.  
The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea applies in the high seas202 
establishing rules for vessels for avoiding collisions at sea. It foresees different light and sound 
signals to avoid collisions.203 The purpose of these measures is clearly to make vessels visible 
to each other. Accordingly, making an aircraft visible for others does not limit the freedom of 
navigation, but fulfils the obligation to due regard other States rights while performing yours. 
Therefore, the use of transponders is a method to promote the safety of navigation and helps to 
avoid collisions, the same way as the International Maritime Organization has established such 
measures for vessels. If All in all, establishing a treaty obligation to use activated transponders 
does not modify or suspend the effective execution of the freedom of overflight and is not 
prohibited under UNCLOS.  
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Paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of Article 311 give States a possibility to conclude treaties with two or 
more members that could modify or suspend the operation of provisions of UNCLOS.204 
However, those treaties are allowed only under strict conditions, namely, that such treaties must 
not include provisions derogation that is incompatible with the effective execution of the object 
and purpose of UNCLOS, must not affect the application of the basic principles manifested in 
UNCLOS, are not allowed to make changes to the basic principle about the common heritage 
of mankind, and must not have an effect to the rights and duties that other States have under 
UNCLOS.205 Furthermore, according to the commentaries of UNCLOS, the wording of 
paragraph 2 of Article 311 was offered to consider previous treaties that have been made about 
freedom of navigation and overflight, the Chicago convention for example,206 which suggests 
that States did consider it possible to modify or suspend the freedom of navigation and 
overflight with other treaty than UNCLOS itself. 
The rights and obligations in the UNCLOS commentaries about Article 311 are only referring 
to the common heritage, the Area, marine environment protection, and other resources related 
areas, like the fishing.207 UNCLOS Article 311(3) prohibits the derogation from the basic 
principles of the convention, however, there is no exhaustive list of those basic principles.208 
According to Article 136 of UNCLOS, common heritage of mankind is the Area and its 
resources. The lawful performance of the freedom of overflight does not have an effect on the 
Area nor to its resources, so this part of the rule is not prohibiting the States to sign a 
transponders related treaty. 
The freedom of the high seas is considered as one of the basic principles.209 Innocent passage 
regime, however,  does not necessarily qualify as the basic principle.210 It has been argued that 
the navigation freedoms States have in the high seas are not equal to the navigation rights in the 
EEZ, because of the coastal State’s abilities to put restrictions on their performance under 
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UNCLOS.211 When innocent passage, that is a customary law rule, is not one of the basic 
principles of UNCLOS, then it is difficult to argue that the freedom of overflight is. Therefore, 
the limitation of the freedom of overflight with an inter se treaty is not prohibited under 
UNCLOS rules.  
However, since innocent passage cannot be suspended for third States by an inter se agreement, 
States could limit the innocent passage between each other, but this does not have an effect on 
other States.212 However, since the Baltic Sea is a semi-closed sea, there are no military aircraft 
from other States that would have a legitimate reason to fly in that area. Even if the NATO 
forces who are performing the air-policing in the Baltic States, they do it on the basis of a treaty 
and it is potentially possible to include the obligation to use activated transponders in that treaty. 
While Article 311 specifically states that international agreements that have different rules than 
those in UNCLOS are not legally binding to those States that are not members to the agreement, 
it is considered that the role of Article 311 is only clarifying in the that aspect, since the 
customary law rule reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties Article 34, pacta 
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, prevails in any event.213 Therefore, when the States in the Baltic 
Sea area would conclude a treaty obligation for military aircraft to use activated transponders 
while flying in the Baltic Sea area, this obligation would not be effective to other State’s military 
aircraft, both, because of Article 311(3) and because of customary law. 
Inter se agreements that are in breach of UNCLOS Art 311(3) remain valid and effective, 
regardless of the fact that they are illegal, since the law of treaties nor Article 311 itself give 
any indication that the validity of these agreements would be affected when they are in 
contradiction to the rules set in Art 311.214 However, they may give rise to claims for 
responsibility for illegal acts.215  
Taking it all into account, there is no clear evidence that freedom of overflight belongs under 
those exceptions that are listed in UNCLOS Article 311(3) that are prohibited to change with a 
multilateral treaty. Therefore, UNCLOS itself does not literally prohibit the establishment of a 
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treaty obligation for military aircraft to use transponders. States can try to negotiate over the 
details of the treaty on their own, but they can potentially also use the help of international 
organizations they are member to. The next subchapter helps to choose which international 
organization would be the most suitable for that. 
 
2.5. Regulations of international organizations  
Since most of the States around the Baltic Sea are members of the European Union (EU), it 
would be correct to see the regulations that apply in the region. Many States have included the 
EU regulations in their national acts. 
UNCLOS is binding to the members and institutions of the EU, however it influences the 
legislation of the EU mostly concerning the fisheries and the protection of marine 
environment.216 Therefore, for the purpose of present research it is not reasonable to specifically 
analyze those regulations in more detail. 
It could be assumed, that if NATO, European Union, EASA or EUROCONTROL would 
establish an obligation for its members States to start using activated transponders on their 
military aircraft, then the situation would get better in the Baltic Sea region. However, Sweden, 
Finland and Russia are not part of the organization and Russia is not part of any of them. 
European Union cannot help either, because the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union217 explicitly excludes military and security matters.218 While most of the reports are 
about Russian aircraft, actions inside the organization would not solve the problem.  
The highest expectations can be put to the European Organization for the Safety of Air 
Navigation, the EUROCONTROL that is an intergovernmental organization with 41 Member 
                                                 
216 R. Long. The European Union and Law of the Sea Convention at the Age of 30 – David Freestone 
(ed.) The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention at 30: Success, Challenges and New Agendas. 
Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013, p. 39. 
217 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Lisbon 13.12.2007, e.i.f. 1.12.2009. 
218 S. Andries. European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, September 2017, para. 24. 
48 
 
States including all of the States in the Baltic Sea area, except for Russian Federation.219 The 
terminology used in the convention the EUROCONTROL is based on and in Chicago 
convention have strong similarities.220 However, opposite to ICAO, EUROCONTROL does 
not deal with only about civil aviation matters. 
There are civil and military representatives of member States in the Permanent Commission of 
the supranational organization and its decisions are binding to the member States.221 High-level 
military officials of the member States can advise on issues about civil-military interface by 
explaining the specific needs of military aviation.222 EUROCONTROL is a highly efficient 
civil-military organization where civil-military matters have been fully integrated to all required 
levels of the organization.223 If an international organization could help to solve the problem 
with non-activated transponders in the Baltic Sea Region, EUROCONTROL should be the first 
who to turn to.  
Another efficient way to perform civil-military cooperation is to organize it with the help of the 
ICAO. Not that the ICAO would establish the regulations to the States itself, but by bringing 
all the States behind one table would already help the States to negotiate and find a solution. 
The ICAO has connections with most States of the world, since it has 192 members.224 Creating 
universal rules would be the easiest way to solve the situation, although, the negotiations might 
not be as simple as for the creation of a bilateral treaty. 
The ICAO can also help to solve the situation with the transponders by updating the Chicago 
convention Article 3 considering the rules regarding State aircraft over the neutral waters, 
continuing cooperation in ICAO Baltic Sea Project Team and by supporting civil-military 
cooperation under the organization.  
The Chicago Convention has excluded military aircraft, thus the regulation agreed on the 
convention does not apply to them. Article 3(a) and (b) give the limitation that the convention 
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is applicable only to civil aircraft and not to state aircraft, and considers aircraft used in military, 
customs and police services as state aircraft. Accordingly, military aircraft belong under state 
aircraft and the rules from the Chicago convention do not apply to them. 
 
To help solving the problem with non-activated transponders in the Baltic Sea area, it would be 
necessary to make a small change to this Article and make the regulations applicable to military 
aircraft that are flying over the EEZ. Since Article 3 divided State aircraft to those with different 
purpose, it should be analyzed if it is necessary to add the requirement to all State aircraft or 
only to military. This should be analyzed in the crafting of the annex with taking into account 
all of the positive sides and the threats that may emerge. Limits of this paper exclude the 
possibility to perform the analyze in this paper. 
There is a Baltic Sea Project Team that was formed by The European Air Navigation Planning 
Group that was established by the Council of ICAO.225 The team was formed with the 
overarching aim of preventing aircraft collisions.226 The members of the team included States 
surrounding the Baltic Sea, i.e. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Russian Federation and Sweden, also ICAO, NATO, European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) and EUROCONTROL.227  
Their findings of the Baltic Sea Project Team concluded in March 2015 for the solutions were 
that there are three major ways to improve safety:  
• the use of primary radar data by civil air navigation service providers;  
• the provision of flight plans for military flights; and  
• the establishment of radio contact with civil air navigation service providers by 
military aircraft.”228 
As it seems, all of these three ways may require the civil-military cooperation. The ICAO has 
formed a paper about the civil-military cooperation about aviation navigation already in 
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2011.229 The document advises that States should take a balanced approach to airspace 
management, so it meets the needs of international traffic flows and national security.230 Using 
activated transponders on their military aircraft would be an action by the States to meet this 
advice. 
Although, there are several options to deal with the problems that military aircraft create while 
flying without activated transponders, not all of them easy to use and might not even be 
reasonable. It is clear, that the best and safest results will be made with the cooperation of States 
in the Baltic Sea area, EUROCONTROL, EASA, ICAO, NATO and other relevant Parties. 
However, there are still some small regulations that could have an effect on the freedom of 
overflight that States could adopt on their national legislation. The aviation acts of the States in 
the Baltic Sea area are analyzed below. 
 
  
                                                 
229 ICAO. Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management. Accessible at: 
https://www.icao.int/apac/meetings/2012_cmc/cir330_en.pdf (07.03.2018). 
230 Ibid., p. (v). 
51 
 
 
III STATE’S RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER NATIONAL 
LAW OF THE STATES IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION 
Baltic Sea is a semi-closed sea with a narrow EEZ in the middle (Annex 1). Coastal States of 
the Baltic Sea are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
and Russia.231  
Annex 1. Territorial sea and EEZ in the Baltic Sea.  
 
Source: Latvian Ministry of Defence Concerned Re Russia’s Missile Tests in Latvia’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone. Mining Awareness, 06.04.2018; Accessible at: 
https://miningawareness.wordpress.com/2018/04/06/latvian-ministry-of-defence-concerned-re-russias-
missile-tests-in-latvias-exclusive-economic-zone/img_0497/ (22.04.2018).  
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Maritime Zones and Maritime Delimitation, United Nations, 26.04.2002; Accessible at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/baltic_sea.htm (22.04.2018). 
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The legal nature of EEZ is reaffirmed within the context of national legislation.232 It has been 
observed that the rights of the coastal State have been emphasized in many legislations while 
the reference to obligations of the coastal State has mainly remained exceptional, also, there is 
usually not much about the corresponding rights that other States might have.233 Many States 
have put effort on interpreting the provisions of UNCLOS in the light of the interest of their 
State, however, these interpretations have usually been about the marine resources.234 How and 
if the coastal States of the Baltic Sea have regulated their aviation regulations about foreign 
military aircraft, will be analyzed as follows.  
 
3.1. Regulations about air navigation safety violations 
Only Estonia has made failure to use an activated transponder a violation of law under their 
Aviation Act, this cannot be found in other State’s aviation regulations. According to Estonian 
Aviation Law235 § 6028 that failure to use a transponder in the controlled airspace can lead to a 
fine that may be up to 13 000 euros for a legal person. Another question is how to ensure the 
law enforcement in this matter when the aircraft refuses to land or belongs to another State who 
refuses to pay the fine. There was a provision that allowed the grounding of an aircraft in the 
event of failure to comply with safety requirements, but the provision was declared as invalid 
from March 2018. 
Latvia236 has also a more specific rule about navigation safety, however, they consider the 
failure to follow the flight plan as a violation. The Latvian Law on Aviation237 Section 49 puts 
an obligation to the aircraft crew to take all necessary measures to restore the flight in 
accordance to the flight plan, if the aircraft has made an unauthorized flight into the territory of 
Latvia. There is no fine established in the Act for this kind of violation. Again, a regulation that 
                                                 
232 F. O. Vicuna. State Practice and National Legislation Relating to the Exclusive Economic Zone, the 
Continental Shelf and Straits Used for International Navigation: Basic Trends – R. Wolfrum (ed). Law 
of the Sea at the Crossroads: The Continuing Search for a Universally Accepted Regime. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot 1991, p. 360. 
233 Ibid, p. 354. 
234 Ibid., p. 358. 
235 Estonian Aviation Act. Adopted 17.02.1999, e.i.f. 01.09.1999. 
236 The translation of Latvian Law on Aviation into English was valid 22.04.2014.–31.10.2014, therefore 
it was not possible to include the amendments adopted in 02.10.2014., 09.06.2016., 23.11.2017. 
237 Latvian Law on Aviation. Adopted: 05.10.1994, e.i.f. 03.11.1994.  
53 
 
only the Latvians have established in the Baltic Sea area and other States do not have this 
specific rule in their national acts. 
Other States in Baltic Sea region do not have a special provision about transponders or about 
failure to fly according to the flight plan, however, Finland and Sweden have some more general 
regulations about the navigation safety for aircraft in legal acts.  
Section 4 of the Finnish Aviation Act regulates military aviation and allows the Government to 
make exceptions to military aviation, with consideration that it will not put the safety of civil 
aviation in danger. The Government of Finland has the right to restrict aviation in certain danger 
areas, like in the vicinity of nuclear power plants and areas essential for national defence.238 
With latter provision Finland uses its right under international law to create air defence zones 
by confirming this right in national legislation and regulating the process. 
Danish Air Navigation Act239 has separate part for military and other non-commercial State air 
traffic. This makes it the only State near the Baltic Sea who has a pointed out the different 
regulation of civil and State aircraft in this simple way.  
According to Danish Air Navigation Act § 154 the Minister of Defence has the right to decide 
to what extent the regulations on civil aviation are applicable to Danish military aircraft and 
otherwise in connection with military air traffic, however, the Minister needs to negotiate on 
the matter with the Minister of Transport, before implementing any different regulations from 
the act. The term “otherwise in connection with military air traffic” should refer to State aircraft 
while leaving a sufficiently broad interpretation opportunity whenever it might be necessary. 
Then again, § 155 of the Danish Air Navigation Act is about „Danish aircraft that are not 
military, but are exclusively used by the Danish [S]tate for non-commercial purposes.“ The 
difference between those two types of aircraft might be difficult to understand, but as they are 
put like this, Denmark differentiates between State aircraft in military purposes, and State 
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aircraft with non-military and non-commercial purposes. This approach is not used by any of 
the other States in the Baltic Sea area. 
 
3.2. Regulation about safety of the State’s airspace  
All States in the Baltic Sea area have used their sovereign right to determine who and on which 
conditions has the permission to enter their airspace. Latvia has not clearly defined those rules 
in its Law on Aviation. 
There is a regulation issued under the Estonian National Defence Act240, that regulates the 
permissions given to foreign military vessels and aircraft prior entering the Estonian territory 
that is called Procedure for the granting of clearance for a warship of a foreign state to enter the 
territorial and internal waters and for the granting of clearance for a national aircraft of a foreign 
state to enter the airspace.241 According to § 2 of this regulation, the aircraft of a foreign State 
must have an air traffic control clearance as the basis on which it may enter the territory of 
Estonia. In addition to the obligation to ask permission before entering the airspace of Estonia, 
there are no other obligations put on foreign States under national legislation regarding the 
aviation for military aircraft.  
Lithuanian Law on Aviation242 Article 3(3) declares that the legal acts of other States apply to 
the aircraft of these States only when there is no conflict between them, otherwise the 
Lithuanian law will prevail. According to Article 14 of the latter law, the special regulations 
made for military air traffic is made while taking into account that it would not endanger the 
safety of civil aircraft.  Concerning the latter, Lithuanian national laws do not have specific 
rules set for foreign military aircraft. Therefore, foreign military aircraft approaching the 
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airspace of Lithuania should rather rely on the principle of territorial sovereignty, general rules 
of international law, and agreements made between Lithuania and their country of origin. 
Finnish Aviation Act243 is applicable within the territory of Finland, although, some sections 
apply outside the Finnish territory as well, as stated in Section 1(2). With this, Finland also 
gives importance to the State sovereignty principle. According to Section 7 of the Finnish 
Aviation Act, right to aviation within the Finnish territory is for those aircraft that have the 
nationality of Finland or another State who is acceded to the Chicago Convention, otherwise 
they need a special authorization issued by the Finnish Transport Safety Agency. This provision 
takes international treaties into considerations and gives an exemption to cases that go under 
international obligations binding on Finland.244 
Swedish Aviation Act245 Chapter 14 Section 11 regulates the access by a foreign State aviation 
to Swedish territory and leaves the regulation for the Government or a public authority 
appointed by the Government to decide. There is not specified what kind of public authority 
should it be or what is the definition of a public authority in the context of this Act. Swedes also 
have an Ordinance246 that is given out under the Aviation Act. It regulates the navigation in 
restricted areas under Chapter 1 Section 5 and allows to prohibit the aviation in the area for up 
to two weeks. With this provision, Sweden has used its right under international law to create 
air defence zones where the navigation for foreign State civil and military aircraft is limited.  
Denmark allows to use its territory by foreign military and State aircraft only after it gets a prior 
permission from the Minister of Defence, who again can give the permission only after 
negotiating with the Minister of Transport.247 With this procedure Denmark guarantees the 
safety of national security and safety of civil aviation. This procedure means the fulfilment of 
Danish obligation under international law to consider the safety of civil aviation when 
organizing the navigation for military aircraft. Other States considered in this paper do not have 
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the procedure like that, at least established in as high level of legislation. For example, Estonian 
National Defence Act § 43(1) foresees that the permission should be granted by the minister 
responsible for the organization of national defence.  
Article 79 paragraph 4248 of the Russian Air Code international flights of aircraft must be carried 
out on the basis of international agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party to, or 
with permissions issued according to the procedure established by the Government of the 
Russian Federation. According to Article 3 of the Russian Air Code, international agreements 
to which Russia is a party to shall prevail in case of there are overlapping provisions that differ 
from the Russian Air Code. If an international agreement to which the Russian Federation is a 
party to sets forth provisions which differ from the provisions of the Russian Air Code the 
provisions of the international agreement shall be applied. This provision is promising in regard 
to the potential treaty that could be made between the States in the Baltic Sea region. Although, 
this provision is most likely applicable to civil aircraft, it does not exclude a possibility for an 
international treaty that regulates the use of transponders for the military aircraft as well.  
Latvia and Russia have special provisions that consider the sovereignty and safety of the State’s 
airspace.  
Section 491 of Latvian Law on Aviation reflects the fears risen after the 11 September 2001 
attacks on the World Trade Center, while it allows the Minister of Defence to take decision on 
whether to take combat operation against an aircraft that is being used as a weapon for the 
destruction of people in the territory of Latvia. The purpose of this provision is to guarantee the 
safety of the State airspace. With this provision, Latvia emphasizes that, in some conditions in 
the consideration of the Minister of Defence, it has a right to take forceful measures against it, 
including the right to shoot down the aircraft that is violating their airspace.  
Germany also has a provision in case an aircraft is intended to be used against human life and 
allows to use force against it as a last resort, however, in that provision the protected object is 
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human life not the territory of the State.249 Other States have not included a provision about 
terrorism attacks conducted by an aircraft to their national legal acts. 
In Article 1(1) of the Russian Air Code250 it is emphasized that “The Russian Federation shall 
have complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space of the Russian Federation.” By this 
statement, the importance of territorial sovereignty is emphasized and the obligation to respect 
the territorial sovereignty is reminded to other States.  
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to find out if the establishment of a treaty obligation for military 
aircraft to fly with activated transponders over the Baltic Sea is allowed under international law. 
The need for it comes from the fact that for years military aircraft have caused a threat of 
collision with other aircraft in the Baltic Sea area, since they have not always used an activated 
transponder that would make them visible on the radars of civil aircraft. Since there is no 
obligation under international law for military aircraft to use activated transponders then it is 
not possible to discipline the violators under international law and the State responsibility either.  
The main problem about the establishment of the obligation to use activated transponders is 
that the freedom of overflight in the EEZ is a customary law principle and it is questionable if 
coastal States have a right to set limits to that freedom. Also, UNCLOS Article 311(3) sets 
limits to signing inter se treaties to limit the principal freedoms that are provided by the 
convention.  
There was three parts in this study that helped to find a solution to the problem. The first one 
gave the background to the problem and its current legal situation, clearing the limits of the 
freedom of overflight and showing the importance of transponders, also, the difference between 
civil and military aircraft’s status and regulation under international law was analyzed. The 
study went on by analyzing the rights and obligations that States have under international law 
that have an effect on the freedom of overflight. More rights than obligations were found which 
also characterizes the current situation. Lastly, it was analyzed if coastal States of the Baltic 
Sea have already regulated the freedom of overflight for other States military aircraft in their 
national law. 
The hypothesis of the study was that it is possible to establish a treaty obligation to make 
military aircraft fly with activated transponders in the EEZ. There are two main reasons for that. 
Firstly, there is no prohibition under international law that prohibits such a treaty, even 
UNCLOS Article 311(3) does not prohibit inter se treaties to regulate the safety of the freedom 
of overflight in the EEZ. Secondly, the freedom of overflight in the EEZ is not an unlimited 
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right. Furthermore, the obligation to use activated transponders does not represent a direct 
limitation to the freedom, but rather a safety measure. The practice of the States also refers to 
the legality of establishing safety measures to the navigation at seas. Accordingly, the 
hypothesis was confirmed. 
The primary research question was: On which legal grounds would it be possible to establish 
an international obligation for military aircraft to fly with activated transponders over the Baltic 
Sea? 
There is the Chicago convention that regulates international civil aviation, but explicitly 
excludes military aviation. One of the options would be to make an amendment to it, so it would 
apply to military aircraft also, but this is not recommended due to national security reasons of 
State. Another option is to sign an international treaty that would regulate the aviation 
navigation for military aircraft, at least in the problematic areas, and would guarantee the safe 
navigation of all aircraft at least in a certain area. Since it was found in the study that signing 
inter se treaties that regulate the modification or limitation of the freedom of overflight in the 
EEZ is not prohibited, the treaty between the coastal States of the Baltic Sea would be the best 
option to establish an obligation for the military aircraft to fly with activated transponders. 
However, there are two aspects to keep in mind.  
Firstly, as it was confirmed by the study, the treaty can be made only with the consent of 
sovereign States. Therefore, even if there is no legal obstacle for creating the treaty obligation, 
the purpose of the obligation is ensured only when all of the coastal States of the Baltic Sea 
sign it, including Russian Federation. Secondly, it must be considered that the treaty would 
apply only to those States who have signed it. However, since the Baltic Sea is a semi-closed 
sea, there are no military aircraft from other States that would have a legitimate reason to fly in 
that area. Even if the NATO forces who are performing the air-policing in the Baltic States, 
they do it on the basis of a treaty and it is potentially possible to include the obligation to use 
activated transponders in that treaty. 
Additionally, it was asked, if coastal States have a right to limit the freedom of overflight in the 
EEZ only for navigational safety purposes? 
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Analyzing UNCLOS, coastal States have sovereign rights in the EEZ concerning the 
management of natural resources, environmental protection, scientific research, and 
establishment of artificial islands. Coastal States do not have a direct right to limit the freedom 
of navigation in the EEZ, but when exercising rights over previously named areas, limits to 
navigation may occur. For example, in the same areas coastal States may establish air defence 
zones to restrict navigation in some certain areas. However, establishing those zones beyond 
the territorial sea can challenge the principle of State sovereignty, especially since the ADIZ 
implies that the State has to perform law enforcement outside its territory. All in all, the 
establishment of ADIZ in the Baltic Sea is not a solution to the non-activated transponders 
problem. 
  
According to UNCLOS, the freedom of overflight is a right that can be use in the high seas and 
in the EEZ. There is no high seas in the Baltic Sea, so the question in the present case is limited 
to the EEZ that was unfortunately not established before the drafting of the Chicago Convention 
that is also limited to civil aircraft only. As a result, the freedom of overflight for military 
aircraft is only indirectly regulated in UNCLOS, but not in other conventions so far. It has been 
offered to make an amendment to the Chicago convention, so it would be applicable to military 
aircraft, however others do not recommend it due to State’s national security reasons. Therefore, 
creating the obligation to use transponders with a new international treaty would be the best 
solution. 
The obligation to use activated transponders can be seen as a limitation to the freedom of 
overflight. UNCLOS allows to make limitations to other State’s rights in the EEZ only on 
certain conditions, mostly for guaranteeing the coastal State’s exclusive rights to fisheries and 
other resources, also, in certain cases, when the State has created artificial islands, installations, 
and natural reserves. Exercising the rights efficiently enough over these areas could lead to the 
limitation of other State’s navigational rights by the coastal State. The limitation of the freedom 
of overflight is not explicitly allowed under international law, since States have sovereign 
power only over their territory. 
The status of civil and state aircraft has been different since the first codification of international 
aviation law rules. Even if the definition of a military aircraft can also be different depending 
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on their characteristics and on the purpose of their use, it is always considered to have the same 
rules as other state aircraft. These rules, however, as rare as they can be found at all, are mostly 
in negative and state what does not apply to them or what are they not allowed to do. Since 
there are no concrete regulations for military aircraft, there is also no obligation for them to use 
activated transponders. The failure to use activated transponders means that the military aircraft 
is not visible on civil radars and may lead to collisions with civil aircraft, as it has almost 
happened in the Baltic Sea area several times already.  
The principle of territorial sovereignty effects international relations as well as international 
law. States have sovereign power over their territory and therefore they can decide who to allow 
on their territory. States also have sovereign power to decide which treaty to sign and which 
obligations to take on itself under international law. This right is called the principle of free 
consent and it has affected the development of international legal obligations. The prerequisite 
for the establishment of a treaty obligation to use activated transponders is, therefore, the free 
consent of all of the coastal States of the Baltic Sea.  
In the EEZ, coastal States have jurisdiction in the areas that are primary connected to the marine 
resources, thus the primary purpose of the legislation a coastal State adopts cannot be the 
regulation of navigation. When States discussed over the establishment of the EEZ as a new 
zone, the marine powers were able to keep their high seas right of the freedom of navigation 
and overflight.  
While the rights of coastal States and other States are different, they all are bound to the 
obligation to due take account of the rights and duties of other States. The obligation to use the 
sea in peaceful purposes applies also to all States, prohibiting the use or a threat of use of force 
against any State while exercising rights and performing duties under UNCLOS.  
The biggest obstacle when considering the creation of a treaty obligation that could limit or 
modify a right that is provided under UNCLOS, is in UNCLOS Art 311(3). Article 311 
determines the relations between UNCLOS and other international treaties and its paragraph 3 
regulates the permissibility of inter se agreements. According to latter, States may conclude 
treaties over the matters in UNCLOS, when the treaty does not affect the execution of the object 
and purpose of and the application of the basic principles in UNCLOS, and if it does not affect 
the rights and obligations other States have under UNCLOS.  
62 
 
The rights and obligations that are referred to in Article 311 are connected to the common 
heritage of mankind, the Area, marine environmental protection, and resources related areas. 
Also, the freedom of overflight is not one of the basic principles of UNCLOS. Therefore, it was 
found that Article 311(3) does not prohibit the establishment of a treaty obligation that regulates 
the freedom of overflight in the EEZ. 
States can draft the treaty with the help of international organizations. Since all of the States in 
the Baltic Sea region are members of the ICAO, the organization could help to bring the States 
together and by offering the peaceful means of solving the situation. However, ICAO regulates 
civil aviation only and it cannot give regulations for military aircraft. EUROCONTROL, on the 
other hand, has military representatives from the member States who can advise on the issues 
about civil-military interface. Unfortunately, the fact that Russian Federation is not a member 
to EUROCONTROL is a strong contra argument when considering using the help of 
international institutions to establish an obligation for military aircraft in the Baltic Sea area.  
According to the national laws of States, aircraft have to identify themselves when approaching 
the State airspace. There is no such obligation under international law directly that would apply 
to military aircraft, only the obligation to respect the laws of the coastal State. An obligation to 
use an activated transponder that would be set in national laws of the States in the Baltic Sea 
area, would however not solve the problem concerning the threat of collision between civil 
aircraft and military aircraft that are not using activated transponders. First, because one State 
cannot put obligations to another State or an aircraft belonging to another State, and second, the 
threat would still remain active in the EEZ of the Baltic Sea.  
While analyzing national legal acts of the States in the Baltic Sea area, the goal was to see if 
and how the aviation navigation was regulated for foreign State military aircraft. The subject 
of most legal acts was civil aircraft and those provisions that applied to military aircraft as well 
were brought out specifically. Hence the conclusion, that States have a special regulation for 
their own military aircraft and the aviation rules are distinguished already inside the States. 
Military aircraft from another State must usually ask for the approval of the State which territory 
it wishes to enter.  
Overall, it was seen that even when States make exceptions for military aviation, then those 
exceptions must always guarantee the safety of civil air navigation. Even though, most of the 
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legislation is applicable only in the territory of the certain State who accepted the law, some 
parts of it are declared to apply even outside the territory. The States give importance to the 
territorial sovereignty however, it is stated in some of the Acts that they apply outside the State 
territory in certain conditions.  
National defence acts of States in the Baltic Sea area do not regulate the navigational matters 
of foreign military aircraft. National aviation laws of the States in the Baltic Sea area do not 
exclude the possibility to sign a treaty to limit the freedom of overflight or to set measures for 
promoting navigational safety. 
 
From the analysis of the thesis it clear that there is no legal obstacle to sign a treaty to obligate 
military aircraft to use activated transponders while they fly over the Baltic Sea. The coastal 
States of the Baltic Sea can and should sign the treaty to contribute to the safety of the aviation 
navigation in the region.   
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ABBREVIATIONS 
ADIZ - Air defence identification zone 
Chicago Convention - Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation  
EEZ - Exclusive economic zone  
EU - European Union  
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization  
ICJ - International Court of Justice  
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
Paris Convention - Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation  
UN - United Nations  
UNCLOS - The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  
UAV - Unmanned aerial vehicles 
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